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Accountability in an iTaukei corporation: The case for a Fiji provincial company 
 
Abstract  
 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to obtain insights into the systems of accountability 
within provincial companies in Fiji, utilising the theoretical construct „accountability web‟ 
(Gelfand et al., 2004). 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the notion of accountability webs 
(Gelfand et al., 2004) by case studying a Fiji provincial company. An in-depth case study was 
undertaken on the Lau province.  The Lau provincial company is studied, in order to analyse 
its accountability systems. Data was collected through content analysis of the annual reports 
and other information available in the public domain. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the company executives and other stakeholders of the company.  
Findings - The study provides insights into the systems of accountability practised by the 
Lau provincial company. Analysis of the entity studied revealed accountability has been 
influenced by the power distance in society, high levels of trust placed on those in authority 
coupled with low self-accountability, the culture of respect and silence, and the lack of 
attention to detail and planning. This has resulted in weak accountabilities being provided to 
the provincial population.   
Originality/value - No prior study of accountability in developing economies makes 
reference to Gelfand et al.’s (2004) work. It is possible that accountability configurations that 
Gelfand et al. discusses are not necessarily found in the accountability webs that can be 
constructed in such societies. The provincial companies of other provinces have all attempted 
to engage in their respective provinces at some time in their operations. This offers 
opportunities for future research, together with additional analysis on the cultural 
configuration of indigenous Fijian societies and their corresponding accountability system 
Keywords Accountability, Accountability Web, Fiji, Lau province, Lau Provincial Company 
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Introduction  
 
“From the most primitive tribal systems to loosely structured alliances to the most 
sophisticated production systems, social systems of any sort demand, at some level, 
general agreement about expectations and rules guiding behaviour…social systems 
can be defined in terms of shared expectations…Thus, accountability is at the root of 
viable social systems, and all the more so in formal organisations.” (Frink and 
Klimoski, 2004, p. 2) 
 
This paper analyses accountabilities in a form of business entity unique to indigenous Fijian 
society, the provincial company established by one of Fiji‟s fourteen provinces,  in the 
context of Gelfand et al.‟s (2004) definition of accountability and the theoretical construct 
„accountability web‟. 
Gelfand et al. (2004, p.136) argues that much of the theory and research of accountability in 
organisations has focused almost exclusively on western contexts such as United States and 
Western Europe in the context of agency theory, focusing on the principal agent relationship. 
Gelfand et al. recognise the potential for mutual accountability and influence in a given 
setting, allowing them to arrive at the following definition of accountability,-  
“the perception of being answerable for actions and decisions, in accordance with 
interpersonal, social, and structural contingencies, all of which are embedded in 
particular sociocultural contexts” (p.137).  
Gelfand et al. then develop the accountability web concept which takes on a cultural 
perspective and posits how characteristics of accountability are influenced by the dominant 
cultural dimensions [1] in a particular society. The high power distance that exists between 
the indigenous Fijian chiefs and the indigenous population and the communal cultural values 
of indigenous Fijian society (see Davie, 2007; Rika et al., 2008) make Gelfland et al.‟s 
definition of accountability and theoretical framework, an appropriate tool to analyse 
accountability in provincial companies.  
To understand the context in which the Lau provincial company was established, a brief 
historical background is provided. 
Subsequent to annexing Fiji in 1874, Britain established provinces as administrative units 
installing chiefs as Roko (provincial governor) or Buli (district chiefs) among the indigenous 
population to maintain an orderly society, training them as provincial administrators 
(Durutalo, 1997). This entrenched a hierarchical authoritarian social system, where orders 
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filtered from the apex to the base and obedience, with allegiance filtered back from the base 
to the apex (Durutalo, 1997, p. 7). 
The chiefs were elevated to greater status and authority in 1945 during the reorganization of 
the Fijian Administration, which gave leading chiefs almost full command  over Fijian affairs 
(Norton, 2002). This strengthened their authority as provincial/district administrators, and 
established the chiefly authority as an autonomous body within the government of Fiji. The 
chiefly bureaucratic and political elite were projected as the guardians of indigenous Fijian 
identity, culture and economic benefits in the face of the growing Indian population[2] 
(Durutalo, op cit., p. 138; Norton, 2002, p. 108). The reinforcement of the chiefly hegemony 
through the creation of provincial councils created a recognised political and social 
aristocracy within the indigenous Fijian community (Davie 2005, p. 522), which served to 
establish them as a group where authority is above question. While the influence of this 
aristocracy has been eroded at the national level by the coup d'état of 2006, chiefs are still 
highly influential in provincial affairs (see Rika et al., 2008).  
The provincial councils‟ role has evolved from provincial administration to one of facilitating 
indigenous Fijian participation in commerce with the establishment of one, or more, 
provincial companies to operate as their commercial arm. Provincial chiefs have typically 
taken a key role in establishing these companies and in some cases assuming roles as 
company executives. In conventional terms, these companies have not been a success, with 
such companies typically reporting losses. 
This paper case studies the Lau provincial company, which would appear to be the stand out 
exception. The Lau provincial company was established in October 1971 at the instigation of 
the province‟s paramount chief at that time[3], who established the company with the 
financial assistance of the province, to operate as an investment vehicle.  However, as 
investment opportunities on Fiji‟s mainland are far more substantial than those available in 
the Lau group of islands, the provincial company‟s assets are located on Fiji‟s largest land 
mass. These include investments in financial and real assets, including hotels and a tourist 
facility[4].  
The balance of this paper is structured as follows. The paper begins with an outline of 
Gelfand et al.‟s accountability web theoretical framework. Then traditional indigenous Fijian 
society‟s cultural accountability configuration is discussed. Next, the role of the provincial 
councils in contemporary Fijian society and their need to establish provincial indigenous 
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population‟s participation in the money economy is briefly discussed. It also reviews the 
activities of the provincial company for the Lau Province, the only profitable provincial 
company. The next section provides an analysis of accountability within the company, 
applying the accountability web theoretical framework. This is followed with a discussion on 
the analysis of the accountability web in the Lau provincial company. Finally, the paper 
concludes that accountabilities in indigenous Fijian society are such that commercial entities 
operated at the provincial level are unlikely to contribute to the economic development of the 
province they supposedly serve and offers suggestions for further research. 
 
Theoretical Framework:  Accountability Web 
 
Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 136-7) argues that one of the basic ways in which cultures vary is the 
nature of their accountability systems. Members of a social grouping develop cognitive maps 
of how various individuals, groups and organizations are answerable or accountable to one 
another. 
 Gelfand et al. employ accountability webs to advance the cultural perspective on 
accountability in organisations. The accountability web is a „cognitive map‟ (Gelfand et al., 
2004) which “specifies the expectations and obligations among individuals, groups or 
organizations” . They demonstrate that “cultural forces for accountability are found at 
multiple levels in the organisation: individual, interpersonal and group context, and to the 
organisation at large, which form a loosely coupled accountability web or system”.   
In describing the characteristics of an accountability web, the connections in the 
accountability web between the „individuals, groups or organisations‟[5] need to be 
determined. Relationships among the elements, the direction of connection and the strength 
of the connection between the elements must also be determined. Additionally, structural 
alignment, web alignment and organisational alignment are crucial in understanding the 
nature of accountabilities (Gelfand et al., 2004). 
Connections in an accountability web are defined by their „direction of connection‟ and 
„strength of connection‟. Gelfand et al. propose three types of linkages between the elements 
in an accountability web, which can be either „unidirectional‟ or „bidirectional‟ between 
elements and „self-accountability‟, wherein one evaluates one‟s own actions or decisions and 
compares them with their own internal standards (Gelfand et al., 2004).  
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The second descriptor of how elements are connected in an accountability web is the 
„strength of the connections‟ between the elements. This refers to “the clarity and 
pervasiveness of the connections” between the elements (ibid, p.140).  The strength of the 
connection can be seen in the “clarity of the standards and expectations that are expressed” 
and the pervasiveness of the connection between two elements is a function of the number of 
rules and obligations that one element has to the other.  
There is a strong connection between the two elements when the norms, expectations, and 
obligations are clearly stated and understood by both elements, and this leaves little room for 
deviation from expectations (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 141). Such a strong connection due to 
high clarity in expectations restricts the possibility for the individual to negotiate the terms of 
the relationship. On the other hand, when there is a weak connection, there is little clarity in 
role expectations and this “permits one or both elements to negotiate the terms of the 
relationship”, and so the “nature of the accountability relationship becomes changeable” 
(ibid, p. 140).  
The extent that expectations bind the elements together reflects the pervasiveness of the 
connection. Gelfand et al. further argue that taking a cultural perspective on accountability 
illustrates the culture-specific aspects of organizational functioning,  providing insights into 
the unique cultural configurations of accountability that exist within that organizational 
setting.  
Structural alignment is the extent to which individuals and groups‟ expectations and 
standards are explicated in formal organisational policies, rules, and procedures (Frink and 
Klimoski, 2004, p.7-8). Hence, where there is high structural alignment, the accountability 
webs of individuals and groups would be “perfectly consistent with expectations enacted in 
organisational policies” (Gelfand et al., p. 141). However, in an organization with low 
structural alignment, Gelfand et al. suggest that “expectations of accountability are dictated in 
formal mechanisms and will not necessarily reflect the perceptions of individuals and/or 
groups”. 
Web alignment relates to the extent that the accountability webs held by individuals and 
groups are similar to peer-level individuals and groups in the organisation (Bracci, 2009).  
Organizational alignment refers to the collective perception of who is accountable to whom 
and the strength and pervasiveness of the relationships / accountabilities (Gelfand et al., p. 
142). 
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For effective functioning aligned accountability webs are important between individuals; 
groups and the organization are important, especially where there is intergroup coordination 
and cohesion.  Misalignment can result in conflicts, confusion and intergroup coordination 
and cohesion would suffer. 
Furthermore, Gelfand et al. argue that the primary cultural dimensions influence the norms 
and values of social systems, which in turn shape accountability webs of individuals in a 
society. The three primary cultural dimensions Gelfand et al. focus on are: individualism-
collectivism, cultural tightness-looseness, and hierarchy-egalitarianism (power distance), 
linking them to the specific aspects of accountability webs and coincidentally establishing a 
distinction between cultures.  
Gelfand et al. argue that there are four basic ways in which individualistic cultures differ 
from collectivistic cultures, in terms of accountability webs, i.e. cross-level connections, 
standards of accountability and nature of reactions to breaches of conduct. 
Firstly, in collectivistic cultures, an individual‟s accountability is to entire groups, “which 
provide much of the expectations and monitoring for norm compliance” (Gelfand et al., p. 
144). However for individualistic cultures, “accountability generally rests with specific 
individuals, both for organizational successes and failures”. Secondly, there exist differences 
in the number of cross-level connections. In collectivistic cultures “the group mediates the 
connection to the organization for the individual” (ibid, p. 145), whereas; in individualistic 
cultures “individuals primarily have connections to their immediate supervisors through 
rational contracts specifying particular expectations”.  Another difference relates to 
“extraorganisational sources of accountability”. Expectations from family members and the 
society at large that would be highly salient in collectivist cultures, but not in individualistic 
cultures. Consequently, cross-level connections would be fewer in individualistic cultures 
compared to collectivistic cultures. 
Thirdly, the manner in which standards are communicated, perpetuated and integrated into 
individual accountability webs is another way accountability in collectivistic and 
individualistic culture is expected to differ (Gelfand et al., p. 146). In individualistic cultures; 
there is direct communication of standards which are formalized and explicit in symbolic 
forms in the social context. However, in collectivistic cultures there is indirect 
communication of standards, which “tend to be informal and implicit in the social context” 
(p. 145). Gelfand et al.  stress that this would mean that even though the same standard can 
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be applied in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the way it would be communicated 
would vary and comprehension of the standards would be dependent on an understanding of 
the social context. 
Finally, the differences in accountability webs for differing cultural systems will lead to 
differences in reactions to breaches in codes of conduct in an organizational setting. This is 
due to the differences in the type and perceptions of cross-level connections in organizations. 
As such, in collectivistic cultures, the group is held responsible for any violation to codes of 
conduct. In contrast, the individual is held accountable for violations of codes of conduct, 
regardless of group membership in individualistic cultures. 
The cultural dimension of hierarchy versus egalitarianism is related to the direction of 
connections in accountability webs, which can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In 
hierarchical cultures, standards are predetermined, based on ascribed status and it is people 
with high-power positions that set standards to be obeyed by subordinates (ibid, p.148). On 
the other hand, in egalitarian cultures “standards are based on abstract principles that are 
mutually adhered to by individuals, regardless of status”. Therefore, in hierarchical cultures 
the direction of connections is expected to be unidirectional, whereas, in egalitarian cultures 
the direction of connections is bidirectional pertaining to mutual accountability. 
Gelfand et al. (p.146) referred to cultural tightness and looseness as contrasting cultural 
systems relating to the degree to which “norms are clearly defined and reliably imposed”. 
Hence, the nature of accountability webs within organisations of tight and loose cultures is 
expected to be differentiated by virtue of the strength of the connection and the degree of 
alignment of the accountability system (p. 147). 
Gelfand et al. further argue that in tight cultures order and predictability are important. There 
are clear social norms.  This is strictly enforced with little tolerance for deviance (ibid, p. 
146). Organisations in such culture “are more likely to enact processes to ensure expectations 
are delineated in policies, practices and procedures to create predictability and order” (ibid p. 
147) through explicit mechanisms in individualistic cultures or implicit mechanisms in 
collectivistic cultures. Such cultures develop shared understandings of accountability (ibid, p. 
148), resulting in “more alignment in accountability webs among individuals and their peers 
(horizontal alignment), individuals and their supervisors (vertical alignment), as well as 
individuals within and between groups (group alignment)”.  
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Conversely, in loose cultures where “standards are fewer and more ambiguous” (Gelfand et 
al. ibid, p. 148), behaviours are not closely monitored and there are less severe consequences 
for deviance. Consequently, individuals understanding of accountability are more likely to 
vary resulting in a lack of alignment between individuals and groups with respect to 
accountability webs. Gelfand et al. suggest that this results in lesser predictability and order 
in the organization. 
Gelfand et al. argue that in actual cultural systems the three cultural components would exist 
in combination and must be simultaneously considered to understand and predict the 
accountability behaviour that would exist in an organizational setting. Therefore, even though 
in reality any culture can have numerous forms of accountability webs existing, Gelfand et al. 
argue, a combination of the three cultural dimensions would create a particular accountability 
configuration that can be expected to exist in that social context. Gelfand et al. consider four 
accountability configurations[6] that could exist in a particular culture. These include: an 
individualistic, loose, and egalitarian configuration; a collectivistic, tight, and hierarchical 
configuration; an individualistic, tight, and hierarchical configuration; and a collectivistic, 
loose, and egalitarian configuration. The nature of these configurations is summarised in table 
1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
Interestingly enough, no prior study of accountability in developing economies makes 
reference to Gelfand et al.’s (2004) work. It is possible that accountability configurations that 
Gelfand et al. discusses are not necessarily found in the accountability webs that can be 
constructed in such societies. While the collectivistic, tight, hierarchical configuration would 
appear to be appropriate to indigenous Fijian culture this configuration may not be found in 
reality. This study explores that issue. 
Locating Traditional Indigenous Fijian Society’s Cultural Accountability Configuration 
Mataira (1994) and other studies (Bracci, 2009; Gelfand, et al., 2004; Laughlin, 1996) have 
recognised that accountability should not be seen as a culturally neutral phenomenon. Hence, 
“in order to determine what it means for an individual to be accountable in any given 
situation, we must look to the norms of the community, and determine what obligations the 
individual members of the group have to each other” (Mataira, 1994, p. 32). As Mataira 
(1994) stressed it is important to understand the purpose of those relationships, the processes 
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by which information is exchanged or communicated, and the meaning attached to that 
information. 
Gelfand et al. (2004) has provided a cultural accountability framework whereby cultural 
dimensions shape the important aspects of accountability. This section will illustrate the 
primary cultural dimensions in indigenous Fijian culture and Gelfand et al.‟s framework will 
posit the appropriate cultural accountability configuration. 
Cultural Dimensions in Fiji 
A brief review of indigenous Fijian literature has been undertaken to explain the appropriate 
cultural dimensions in indigenous Fijian culture. 
Collectivism 
The dominant form of indigenous Fijian organisation is seen in its social structure (see Figure 
1) and this defines relationships and obligations of individuals in the society. In a traditional 
Fijian village there are several „Tokatoka‟ (extended family units) which are part of one 
„Mataqali‟ (sub-clan). Several Mataqali will form to make a larger clan known as a 
„Yavusa‟(clan) and several Yavusa will belong to a certain land mass known as the „Vanua‟ 
(confederation of Yavusa / tribe / chiefdom). Ravuvu (1983, p. 76) described the Vanua as: 
“…the living soul or human manifestation of the physical environment which the 
members have since claimed to belong to them and to which they also belong. The 
people are the lewe ni vanua (flesh or members of the land) by which a particular 
Vanua (land in both its physical and social dimensions) is known to other outside 
groups. They are the social identities of the land, and also the means by which the 
land resources are protected and exploited for the sake of the Vanua, the people and 
their customs.” 
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The classical indigenous Fijian social structure as illustrated by Ravuvu (1983, p. 77) is 
shown below. 
Figure 1: Classical Fijian Social Structure 
 
Source: Ravuvu (1983, p.77) 
The various social groups who are subdivided according to blood and other kinship ties 
normally reside in a defined physical territory known as Koro (village) and a Koro may 
consist of several Mataqali (Nayacakalou,1975, p. 21) . The Mataqali is a collective unit, 
which collectively owns resources and is collectively responsible for its usage. Additionally, 
the Mataqali has a responsibility to the Yavusa, in terms of its specific role explained below 
and is directly responsible to the Turaga ni Yavusa (clan chief) or Turaga ni Vanua 
(paramount chief).  
Hence, indigenous Fijian societies can be considered collective in nature, where it consists of 
a society which has a tightly knit social framework. 
Large power distance / Hierarchical 
In the indigenous Fijian social structure illustrated in Figure 1, each Mataqali has its own 
special role to play in the village society. Each Mataqali will be given a specific role and 
position in society, no Mataqali can have dual roles. Therefore, within a Yavusa there may be 
nine Mataqali(s) in these various roles: chiefs/leaders (Turaga); chief advisors and installers 
(Qase ni Vanua / Sauturaga);  spokesmen (Matanivanua); priests (Bete); warriors (Bati); 
heralds (Matake); carpenters and craftsmen (Mataisau); and fisherfolk (Gonedau) 
(Seruvakula, 2000, p. 25-29). 
Vanua 
Yavusa 
Mataqali Mataqali 
Tokatoka 
Tokatoka 
Tokatoka 
Mataqali 
Yavusa Yavusa 
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As explained above the Vanua is made up of several Yavusa, however, one will be the Yavusa 
Turaga (chiefly clan), which will have several Mataqali where one will be the Mataqali 
Turaga (chiefly sub-clan) and will be predominant and head that Yavusa and Vanua as a 
whole. Similarly, within the Mataqali Turaga there are several Tokatoka of which one is the 
Tokatoka (chiefly family unit) will head that Mataqali Turaga and one member of that 
Tokatoka will be the Turaga i Taukei (paramount chief). It is the Turaga i Taukei who is the 
most prominent chief and will head the Vanua. However, other Yavusa and Mataqali will 
also have their Liuliu ni Yavusa (clan leader) and Liuliu ni Mataqali (sub-clan leader), but 
will all be subservient to the Turaga i Taukei. Qalo (1997) referred to such as the 
manifestation of „traditional authority‟. 
Therefore, it can be seen that in an indigenous Fijian society every individual is born into a 
Mataqali that has a specific role and position within that society. Only individuals born into 
the chiefly sub-clan can become chiefs and individuals born into the spokesmen sub-clan can 
become a spokesman. Hence, your birthright determines your status and role in society. 
     Cultural tightness / Strong uncertainty avoidance 
Indigenous Fijian societies have tight cultural systems with social norms for various social 
situations, such as births, marriages, and deaths that are understood and followed by members 
of the society.  
Seruvakula (2000, p. 43) explained  
“…sa vakadeitaka makawa tu o ira na qase na vuda na sala vakavanua me yavu ni 
veitaratara ka i vakaukauwa ni veiwekani ena noda koro, tikina kei na veivanua e 
taudaku ni noda yavutu.” 
Translated as 
“…our forefathers from generations past have established firmly our traditional 
customs as a foundation to strengthen the kinship relations in our village, district, 
province and outside of it.” 
Therefore as seen in Figure 1, Fijian social structure dictates the roles and interaction of 
individuals within an indigenous Fijian society. Seruvakula (2000, p. 30) stresses that each 
and every Mataqali role is considered highly and respected from the chiefly household, and if 
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the chief requires a task to be accomplished by one of the Mataqali according to their 
traditional role, he will send his spokesman with a tabua (whales tooth) or yaqona to the 
leader of that Mataqali to make known the chief‟s request.  When the Mataqali has 
accomplished the chief‟s request, they will send word to the chief‟s spokesman, who will 
make this known to the chief and this will be met with a gift of appreciation from the chief.  
Seruvakula (2000) explained that the Vanua represented by the paramount chief has authority 
over its members and any rebellion is not tolerated. Members who do not follow the decisions 
made by the Vanua in the olden days could be clubbed to death by the warrior clan known as 
Bati, or they may fall ill for no reason, or face an unexplained accident, or be chased out from 
within that Vanua. However, in modern Fijian society it is still characterized by “traditional 
authority, loyalty, obedience, reciprocity, and respect for authority” (Qalo, 1997, p. 111).  
Accountability Constructs in Indigenous Fijian Societies     
According to the accountability web framework by Gelfand et al. (2004), indigenous Fijian 
cultural accountability configuration is collectivistic/tight/hierarchical (see Table 1) and the 
following is to be expected: 
 accountability to entire groups. 
 many standards of accountability but they would be implicit, informal and indirectly 
communicated to society. 
 low tolerance for deviance. 
 high degree of monitoring. 
 shared understandings of accountability. 
 uni-directional accountability. 
 
Background on the Lau Province and the Lau Provincial Company 
The Lau islands lie in an arc some 150 to 200 miles east of Viti Levu, the main island of Fiji, 
and about 300 miles north-west of Tonga (Hooper, 1982). The Lau province comprises of 
fifty seven islands totaling around 490 square kilometers of which only 19 islands are 
inhabited, with a population of around 10,700 people living in the Lau islands and 57,485 
Lauans[7] residing outside of Lau 
(http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/census07_index2.htm).  
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Hooper (1982) explains that an understanding of the Lauan notion of chieftainship is essential 
to an understanding of Lauan society as a whole.  
“The chiefdom of Lau has been an integrated unit under the authority of the paramount 
chief (Sau ni Vanua ko Lau) since the late eighteenth century… and recognize the 
authority of the Sau ni Vanua ko Lau[8] and participate in enterprises which he 
sponsors…” (Hooper, 1982, p. 47) 
The Lau province has 13 districts (Tikina) and 72 villages. Each Tikina will have a number of 
villages and each village is further divided into Mataqali(s) (clans) and the Mataqali is 
further divided into Tokatoka(s) (extended family units). Each Tikina have their own chief 
and so does each village, however, the paramount chief for the Lau province is known as the 
Sau ni Vanua ko Lau. 
 Hooper (1982) explained that “…membership of exogamous clans is in most cases 
determined by patrilineal descent; children are born as members of their father‟s clan…” 
Hooper (ibid) in describing the interactions of groups of people in Lau noted that 
“Honour and respect for elders is one of the fundamental codes of Lauan life and this 
is reflected in allowing precedence to elders, and especially to those who are leaders 
of their clans…this comes about naturally…” (p. 31) 
“Forms of respect for the paramount chief are most marked, since he is the highest 
authority in the chiefdom of Lau…all minor chiefdoms recognize the authority of the 
paramount chief, the Sau ni Vanua, who resides at Tubou, Lakeba.” (p. 46) 
Hooper (ibid, p. 33) further noted that it is not his intention to create an impression that  
“…Lauan social life is restricted and rule-bound…”, however, these “…are social 
graces that are learnt by all members of this society from childhood and their 
implementation is part of the natural flow of things…”  
“It is not a restricting convenience but an almost instinctive and therefore 
comfortable aspect of life.”  
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Lau Provincial Company 
Fiji has fourteen provinces and each province has their provincial administrative office 
staffed by the iTaukei Affairs Board[9] (TAB), a provincial council, which comprises of 
provincial chiefs and elected representatives from the province[10]. With the growing need 
for economic development in the provinces, provincial companies were established, with the 
intention that the latter would look after the province‟s investments and supposedly 
contribute to provincial development. 
To supplement central government finance to provincial councils indigenous adult males are 
required to pay a levy to contribute towards their provincial administrative office operating 
costs. This is payable whether an individual lives in their province of origin or not. In practice 
the burden of meeting the levy falls on those actually living in the province, collecting the 
levies from „expatriates‟ proving to be virtually impossible. In Lau‟s case this can be 
particularly serious for the resident population, as the vast majority of its members live out of 
the province.  
The Lau provincial company‟s share capital has been raised in a number of ways. It is by no 
means clear that shares have been assigned consistent with the contributions made by 
investors. The provincial council may have drawn on the levy in accumulating funds to 
provide equity for the company. Equity was certainly raised through communal fundraising 
activities and from statutory deductions, made from cash flows accruing to copra growers and 
communally owned plantations. The provincial council holds shares in the provincial 
company in its own right. Financial contributions to the council‟s funds would have 
facilitated this investment. However sufficient capital could not be raised within the province 
to sustain planned business activity. The provincial council itself made capital injections into 
the company by utilising an annual government grant of $100,000 provided under a 
government funded Development Assistance Scheme (DAS). Instead of using these monies 
to fund village projects, villages were allocated shares in the company. Until the paramount 
chief‟s death in 2008 dividends accruing on shares held by the council were directly 
reinvested in the company. Dividends on all communally held shares have also been 
reinvested as a matter of course. Additionally, a number of shares are held by individuals 
from the Lau province.  
Since 2007 additional capital has also been obtained from issuing „B‟ class shares to Fiji‟s 
population at large. „A‟ and „B‟ class shareholders have identical rights to dividends, but B 
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class shareholders have no voting rights and are restricted to a single representative on the 
Board of Directors. The Lau provincial company has operated primarily as an investment 
vehicle.  
The company has twelve members in its Board of Directors[11], which is the maximum 
number of Directors as noted in the company‟s Articles of Association and the selection of 
the Board members as explained by the CEO is as follows 
“Two Directors have like automatic seats which is part of the company’s Articles of 
Association, which provides that a male and female heir of the founder get direct 
seats, and the Lau Provincial Council has a seat, than the second largest shareholder 
gets a seat, also two female directors chosen by the area they represent but elected at 
the AGM. B Class Director is nominated by the Board and approved at the AGM, so 
what has happened in the past is the larger Class B shareholders have put up names, 
this goes through the Board and Board nominates who to the AGM. The rest of the 
Board of Directors are elected at the AGM by the shareholders” …” (CEO Interview 
Transcript, 2008) 
Analysing Accountability Web in the Lau Provincial Company 
The organisational structure of the Lau provincial company is illustrated below (Figure 2) to 
clarify the individuals, groups, and units that are part of the company‟s system of 
accountability. 
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Figure 2   Lau Provincial Company Organisational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The accountability structure of the company follows from the above organisational structure, 
as confirmed in an interview with the company‟s Chief Executive Officer (CEO). This is 
where the Board of Directors is accountable to the shareholders of the company in the 
company‟s Annual General Meeting (AGM). The company‟s CEO is directly accountable to 
the Board of Directors, including the two Board subcommittees. Lastly, the five unit 
managers are directly accountable to the company‟s CEO. 
 
At the organisational level, the external parties to which the company sees itself as primarily 
accountable to are the: 
 Shareholders of the company; and 
 Financiers of the company. 
Shareholders, include the Lau Provincial Council (LPC) as well as shareholders from within 
the province such as tikina (s), villages, mataqali (s), family units and individuals.  
 
 
Board of Directors 
AGM: Shareholders 
Board Investment 
Subcommittee 
Board Audit & HR 
Subcommittee 
Company Secretary 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Manager 1 
Finance 
Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 
17 
 
The company‟s CEO in an interview explained: 
“The company is accountable to shareholders including members of the province that 
are shareholders and our financiers …” 
Shareholders are seen as one and the same by the company, accountability to shareholders is 
mainly through the AGM and the disclosures provided in the annual report. Returns to 
shareholders (A and B classes) are primarily through dividends. 
As seen from the Figure 2 above, the direction of the connection is mainly unidirectional, 
that is, a one-way accountability relationship. That is the unit mangers are accountable to the 
CEO without the CEO being accountable to them, and the CEO is directly accountable to the 
Board of Directors, without the Board of Directors being accountable to the CEO. The Board 
of Directors is then accountable to the company‟s shareholders. Additionally, the company is 
also accountable to the LPC during the annual provincial meeting and when the provincial 
administrative office makes its tours in the western and northern parts of Fiji, the company‟s 
team also accompanies them. Accountability in these latter cases, to members of the 
province, is primarily provided by the company CEO. The CEO is recognised by the Tikina 
representatives as the element to be held accountable for the affairs and performance of the 
Lau provincial company. 
“…I believe this will be the CEO, because the Chairwoman[12] it will be quite hard 
to talk with her because of her status.” (Tikina Representative 1 Interview Transcript, 
2009) 
“This I believe is the CEO who runs the operations of the company.” (Tikina 
Representative 2 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
Whereas, some Tikina representatives have a lot of respect for the company as it was 
established by the late paramount chief and feel it is not their right to question the affairs of 
the company. 
“I cannot really say anything against who is to be held accountable in the company 
because our elders have always told us that the establishment of the company was by 
our late high chief. He established and saw to the operations of the company, we as 
members of the province are grateful for his foresight and the people who are now 
running the company. The beneficiaries are the different Tikina(s) and individuals 
who have invested into the company, who are given the freedom to invest their money 
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in their own provincial company.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview Transcript, 
2009) 
 
Below is a discussion of the lines of accountability between the important elements in the 
company, identifying what are the standards and expectations that bind them together and if 
such standards and expectations are clearly stated and understood. 
Board of Directors to Shareholders 
The Board of Directors is accountable to the shareholders of the company in terms of the 
performance and operations of the company. Accountability is provided to shareholders via 
the AGM and the company‟s annual report, as required under the company‟s Articles of 
Association.  
 
“The basic expectation is from shareholders is to get their dividends back…In a 
nutshell, the expectation at the end of the AGM is that they have a profit somehow and 
then they have some dividends declared. Basically every year there has been a 10% 
dividend declared and paid up no matter what profit we make…” (Finance Manager 
Interview Transcript, 2011) 
 
The annual reports reviewed, for the years 2007-2010, meets statutory requirements with 
respect to the financials and governance. However there are no / minimal voluntary 
disclosures. Such narrow, economic, hierarchical forms of accountability as practiced by the 
Lau provincial company may actually lower any sense of responsibility towards the wider 
community (Butler, 2005; Messner, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, the quality of accountability has been compromised to the extent that annual 
reports have not been produced and AGMs not held on a timely basis,   the company‟s AGM 
for the year ending 31
st
 December 2007 held in August the following year. For the year 
ending 31
st
 December 2008 it was held in September, 2009.  Furthermore, Lau provincial 
company did not follow the rules[13] of calling an AGM in 2010 to discuss 2009 financial 
results. 
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 “…last year the company announced to the public the week prior to the 
AGM…however, companies must announce 30 days prior to the AGM. Hence, in the 
last AGM most members from the province did not make it to the AGM. In this year’s 
(2011) AGM for 2010 financial results, prior notice was given and most 
representatives from the province were present to ask questions concerning the 
company finances…” (Trading Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)  
 
Accountability is also provided to its stakeholders[14]  through the annual Lau Provincial 
Council meeting. The Lau provincial company since its inception has always provided a 
presentation to the Lau Provincial Council and their presentation as mentioned by the CEO 
“… is basically a financial update and then  it talks about the upcoming 
developments, and usually members of the provincial council have opportunity to ask 
questions on how the company is progressing and some of them even give their views 
on certain developments or certain proposed developments…” (Lau provincial 
company CEO Interview Transcript, 2010) 
From a review of the Lau provincial administrative office 2009 annual report, it was noted 
that the company CEO presented the prospectus of the company during its visit to the western 
division of Fiji and stressed the need for all the people of the Lau province to individually or 
collectively purchase shares in the provincial company. Similarly, during their tour to the 
northern division of Fiji in July 2009 an issue was raised by the members of the province 
living in the northern division of Fiji. 
“…if the assets strength of the company is over $32 million, why is the province 
facing the greatest challenge of transporting people and cargo in and out of the 
islands.” (Lau Provincial Council, 2010) 
The CEO‟s response was 
“…the company has no intention of going into shipping business and also the board 
does not approve of this business venture…” (Lau Provincial Council, 2010) 
This was also highlighted in an interview 
“…we don’t have any interest at the moment of providing non-economic returns to 
the province. We definitely will not go into shipping. On a social corporate 
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responsibility side we probably will look at some projects to assist the province with 
other partner donors, probably in two years’ time.” (Finance Manager Interview 
Transcript, 2011) 
In interviews and observation of the LPC meeting, it was observed that Tikina representatives 
and chiefs just have praise for the company and are satisfied with the reporting that they 
receive and in some instances are overwhelmed by the complexity of financial reports. 
“I know the benefit it provides to us and to the province. The company has assets like 
no other provincial company and provides a good rate of dividends we benefit from. It 
is our responsibility as members of the province to invest in the company if we are to 
reap the benefits.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
“Yes, the financial affairs of the company are normally explained well to the members 
in the meeting and we always get written reports from the company…” (Tikina 
Representative 1 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
“…the company discusses its affairs at the provincial council meeting; both the CEO 
and Chairwoman will be there, members are happy to get clear explanations from 
them regarding the operations of the company.” (Tikina Representative 2 Interview 
Transcript, 2009) 
“The information that is provided to us as reports from the company is normally all 
aggregated together … It is in the provincial meeting that such information is 
explained by the CEO, then we are able to clearly understand the information 
provided…It is when we take this information to our Tikina that we face a big 
problem, as this depends on the education and knowledge of the Tikina 
Representative. If we the Tikina Representatives are educated and able to grasp the 
financial information disclosed we are able to explain it clearly as well to our Tikina 
members, otherwise than the Tikina Representative will just not be able to transmit 
this information back to the Tikina in a manner for the Tikina to understand it.” 
(Tikina Representative 4 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
Additionally, the company is giving poor accountabilities to the province, where Class A 
shareholders are not getting adequate information.  The majority of Class A shareholders 
have decided to reinvest their dividends into the company over the years in line with the 
advice given by the former paramount chief. However, the company has not reflected these 
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changes in the share capital of Class A shareholders. Thus, provincial shareholders reinvested 
without knowing the terms of reinvestment. 
Additionally, an interview with an official from the Trading Facility through which the 
company shares can be bought and sold revealed that 
“…shareholders from the province have requested the company to provide the annual 
report in the Fijian language similar to that of Fijian Holdings Limited[15], as they 
could not understand the complex language of the current annual report.” (Trading 
Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)  
Hence, the Board of Directors have a moderate connection to the shareholders, as 
accountability is only provided to shareholders on an annual basis through the company‟s 
AGM and annual report, as stated in the company‟s Articles of Association. However, 
currently the timeliness of disclosure to shareholders is determined by the Board of Directors, 
in terms of when the AGM is held and annual reports to be provided to shareholders. Annual 
reports are provided only in the English language with complex terminologies that cannot be 
understood by the provincial shareholders.  
Challenges to accountability within the company include the traditional custom of respect and 
not asking questions, for “to ask a question is to doubt” (Qalo, 1997, p. 116).  Traditional 
authority has dominated in decision-making without providing the necessary accountability. 
There is reluctance by the board of directors to address and expose limitations that existed in 
the company. As Qalo argued this was tolerated, in order not to lose face.  
 Chief Executive Officer to Board of Directors 
One of the Board of Directors main responsibilities is to draw up the company‟s Corporate 
Plan, which is for three years and this sets out what the company will achieve within the 
three-year period. It is from the Corporate Plan that the CEO‟s performance targets are 
determined and this is assessed annually by the Board of Directors.  
 
The CEO is fully accountable to the Board of Directors for the operations of the company as 
a whole, as well as to the two subcommittees.  
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 “…we also have two Board sub-committees, to the Investment Subcommittee 
quarterly we submit like an investment performance report, for them to assess how 
our investments are doing and if there are any issues basically I have to answer to it. 
There is also an Audit & HR subcommittee; we have to provide monthly reports for 
them to see how we’re tracking in terms of our performance targets.” (CEO Interview 
Transcript, 2010) 
“…the subcommittees are really like the so-called engine rooms, for they usually go 
through the investment proposals, the financial reports and they report to the full 
Board.” (CEO Interview Transcript, 2010) 
 
Figure 3    CEO’s Accountability Web 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (                  Loose connections) 
The CEO has to report to the monthly Board meetings, and ad hoc subcommittee meetings. 
This was mentioned by the CEO (Interview Transcript, 2010) 
“…on a monthly basis basically we have Board meetings and we submit management 
reports and the various papers that go with the Board meeting…Basically I submit 
reports to them when they meet and we’re assessed on whether we are on track or not 
and why we’re not on track…but reporting line is basically to the Chair of the 
company.” 
 
In the company‟s annual report and confirmed by the CEO in the interviews, the CEO 
provides the following to the Board of Directors 
 Management updates 
 Financial updates 
 Business investments update 
CEO 
Investment 
Subcommittee 
Audit & HR 
Subcommittee 
Board of Directors 
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 Other issues that may arise in the company 
However, the Finance Manager (Interview Transcript, 2011) explained 
 
“…to be honest the board was given very limited information. The board requested 
for financials but they were never produced, hardly given, when it was given it was 
just in a nutshell no details, no analysis, so the board was quite in the dark on what 
was happening.” 
 
“…There were few questions raised but no follow-ups because at the end of the day 
there was a lot of trust. If you look at this company, the first ever CEO of the company 
after his retirement, his son was appointed as CEO. There was a lot of trust put on 
him. There was no monitoring on the activities of the CEO or on his reports to the 
board.” 
 
In terms of strategic and operational decisions for the company, the Board of Directors still 
has the autonomy of making the decisions, as explained by the CEO (Interview Transcript, 
2010) in the two interview excerpts below: 
“I went to the Board with a proposal to further delegate cheque signing, that I only sign 
off on cheques above a certain amount, and I got told that you have to sign every cheque 
as a second signatory, so in other words they expect me to be their eyes and ears. You 
know I was thinking with the volume of work it might make it easier and efficient, if I’m 
not here.”  
“By way of every investment decision that is made by the company, the decision is made 
by the Board, I merely recommend, so by way of control there’s still a bit of control at the 
Board level but for most of the investments, recommendations are made and then decision 
made by the Board whether to invest or not, there’s healthy discussions and debates on 
certain investments and proposed investments.” 
However, further follow-up interviews with the company revealed that the CEO was not 
providing the correct information to the Board of Directors to base their decisions on. This is 
as the CEO has complete autonomy in preparing the reports for the board of directors and he 
also was in full control of the operations of the company. 
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“The previous CEO was providing weak accountabilities to the board. He provided a 
good overview but he provided the overview of the company operations in such a way, 
as not to be questioned. The board were always been given financial conditions that 
was always good. Therefore, the board had a difficult task on knowing what was 
happening. Thus, the content of the monthly reports that were being provided were 
not good for the BOD to base their decisions on. The board was in the dark on a lot of 
dealings the company was doing...” (Manager Finance Interview Transcript, 2011) 
Also highlighted is the fact that even though there were subcommittees in place to monitor 
the operations of the company, there were no explicit standards on accountability and the 
CEO was able to negotiate his accountability to the board of directors and the subcommittees. 
“There were vague standards of accountability and he (CEO) decides what to report 
to the board and in what format.” (Manager Finance Interview Transcript, 2011) 
 
There is a unidirectional connection between the former CEO and the various elements of the 
Board of Directors to which he is accountable. The strength of the connections can be said to 
be weak, as there is little clarity in the role expectations of the CEO by the Board of 
Directors. The high level of trust and the autonomy to make decisions in the company given 
to the former CEO without being questioned, allowed him to negotiate his accountabilities to 
the board and the shareholders of the company. 
 
“The company owned by the provinces, the culture is such that the board hardly 
questions those in power and those in power have abused it to a lot of extent...” 
(Finance Manager Interview Transcript, 2011)  
 
The CEO is entrenched in an individualistic, loose, hierarchical cultural accountability 
configuration. This is as the CEO takes on the roles expected from the Board of Directors for 
the CEO to perform. The standards of conduct and accountability are implicit and vaguely 
defined for the CEO. However, as the CEO had full autonomy in the operations of the 
company and insufficient monitoring, this led to lack of responsibility and manipulation of 
reports to the board of directors.  
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Unit Managers to the Chief Executive Officer 
There are five managers in the company who all report directly to the CEO daily. The five 
managers have different responsibilities according to the units that they are in charge of and 
are all fully responsible for the operations of their individual units. The CEO (Interview 
Transcript, 2010) explained that the managers 
 
“…send in excel reports everyday where its uploaded into our system and then our 
finance person downstairs then will just go through the reports and then every so often 
the officer does a spot check at the hotels, apartments …the daily reports are mainly 
financial reporting, but like for the Hotels, the manager also provides a report about the 
occupancy, staffing, to keep tabs on what is going on.” 
 
The CEO has significant control of the operations of the hotels, as highlighted in an interview 
with one of the hotel managers. 
 
“Shareholders from the province (A-Class) can get corporate rates to the hotel 
rooms; however, this must be approved by the CEO. They normally directly ask the 
CEO and the CEO will tell us what to charge.” (Manager 1 Interview Transcript, 
2011) 
 
Hence, there is a unidirectional connection between the managers and the CEO, and the 
strength of the connection is strong, as managers understand their roles and responsibilities of 
managing their units, which is clearly stated in their employment contracts. Additionally, the 
manager is connected to the CEO through a number of expectations, such as the daily reports, 
random spot-checks and interpersonal communication norms. 
Chief Executive Officer to Financiers 
The CEO is also accountable to the company‟s financiers due to commitments they have 
made. The financiers and the CEO have a strong connection, as the CEO understands that in 
order to maintain a good relationship with the financiers; he must meet their reporting 
requirements.  
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As explained by the CEO (Interview Transcript, 2009) 
 
“…we have certain commitments that we need to live up to, like to one of our 
financiers we have to provide quarterly financial reports but again that’s just their 
own reporting structure and then we meet on a quarterly basis for me to update them 
how the company is performing, another is annually, but in terms of reporting 
structure I think it’s more just a formality for them to see that the company is on track 
and in a position to meet its payments and commitments to the bank.” 
Constructing Accountability Web in the Lau Provincial Company  
 
Figure 4   Accountability web in the Lau provincial company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Tight connection 
   Loose connection  
The accountability web of the company (see Figure 4) shows a hierarchical form of 
accountability with the CEO being accountable to various parties on the affairs of the 
company. There is weak upwards accountability from the CEO to the Board of Directors and 
External  
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Shareholders 
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Company layer Board of Directors 
Subcommittee 1 Subcommittee 2 
Chief Executive Officer 
Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 
LPC 
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its various committees. The board of directors has placed a high level of trust on the former 
CEO, not monitoring nor questioning the reports and activities sanctioned by the CEO.  
Accountability to shareholders is in accordance to the company‟s Memorandum of 
Association, through the AGM and the annual report to the shareholders. However, since 
2008 the AGM has been held late (September) and the company had not given appropriate 
notice to allow provincial shareholders to be present on one occasion. Recognizing, that the 
provincial council was an initial investor and is a major shareholder in the company, the 
company also makes a presentation at the annual provincial council meeting. This is the only 
form of communal accountability provided to the province. Owing to financial considerations 
this meeting is held on Fiji‟s mainland, with the resident population usually represented by 
Lauans who have emigrated to the mainland. Accountability of the company to resident 
Lauans is therefore nominal at best.  
Whittington (2008, p. 145) explained from the agency theory perspective, management has 
the scope for free action and needs to be monitored by the shareholders. Hence, the 
management presents the financial accounts to the AGM and shareholders can use such 
information to monitor and enhance the performance of management. However, Jones and 
Dugdale (2001) argue accounting must be first accepted as a useful language and a relevant 
analytical tool, only then can it be called forth in systems of accountability. Hence, for the 
case of the Lau provincial company the majority of the shareholders resident in the province 
do not find accounting a useful or relevant language and are not able to understand the 
financial accounts nor able to monitor or enhance the performance of management. 
The forgoing analysis indicates that the cultural traits of the Lau province should call for an 
accountability configuration that is collectivistic, tight and hierarchical. However the 
company depicts an individualistic, loose and hierarchical cultural accountability 
configuration, internally and externally. The locus of accountability is with the self, 
supervisor, and the organisation; the standards of conduct for the CEO, unit managers and 
Board of Directors are vague and implicit. Unit managers are accountable to the CEO; the 
CEO is accountable to the Board of Directors; and the Board of Directors is accountable to 
the shareholders. However, without clear explicit standards of accountability for the various 
elements, accountability between the elements will be open to negotiation.  
The hierarchical culture within the company is prominent as the late paramount chief is the 
founder of the company and was the Chairman and currently, his daughter is the 
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Chairwoman. It can be seen that the late paramount chief made the decisions concerning the 
company. These included decisions  
- on the investment of provincial development funds into the company.  
- the selection of the board of directors. 
- to reinvest the LPC dividends into company. 
- that two directors of the company are from the founder‟s family. 
 
Bracci (2009) highlighted that where there is autonomy without accountability, this may lead 
to lack of responsibility in the organization. For without providing accountability, nobody is 
able to question the responsibility of the CEO in the proper use of resources or achievement 
of objectives. Hence, in the company there were appropriate structures in place for the CEO 
to report to, however, as there was no monitoring on the CEO‟s performance or reports, the 
accountability provided to the board of directors was misleading. This is a result of the high 
level of trust placed on the CEO, which has led to the “…use of communal forms of 
accountability, where expectations are left ill-defined and ex-post probity and legality forms 
of reporting are likely to be accepted (if needed at all).” (Laughlin, 1996, p. 230) 
The accountability web frameworks of the company was first developed through the founder 
and further developed by the Board of Directors, and the Chair. The company considers itself 
just like any other company that is only accountable to the shareholders in the annual general 
meeting but also considers the interests of its founding shareholders and reports to them as 
well in their annual provincial council meetings.  
However, the challenges to accountability within the company include the traditional custom 
of respect and not asking questions, for “to ask a question is to doubt” (Qalo, 1997, p. 116).  
Traditional authority has dominated in decision-making without providing the necessary 
accountability. There is reluctance by the board of directors to address and expose limitations 
that existed in the company. As Qalo (1997) argued this was tolerated, in order not to lose 
face and authority. Velayutham and Perera (2004) found there tends to be a low degree of 
accountability in collectivistic and large power distance societies. Such societies have a 
preference for confidentiality and restrict disclosure of information to those closely involved 
with its management and financing (Qalo, 1997). 
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Conclusion 
The province assisted the Lau provincial company financially in its formative years, by 
channelling funds to it, through the copra development fund, harvest of pine plantations, the 
government development assistance scheme to the provinces and provincial festivals (fund 
raising activities), the decisions being made by the late founder and former chair of the 
council, together with other Lauan elite, whose judgments are considered above question in 
the Lauan culture. 
The company‟s vision and mission statement outlines the company‟s explicit objectives, 
which includes: 
 “…aspire to become one of Fiji’s most successful investment companies.” 
 “…being the preferred investment choice for the people of Lau.” 
The company‟s strategic goals include “enhancing and protecting our shareholders”. The 
company‟s CEO states that the company only operates for the benefit of its shareholders and 
the province will get their returns in the form of dividends.  
Given Lau is a maritime province, the population may have looked to the provincial company 
to provide shipping services, operating wharves, investment in agriculture and fishing 
activities, building ice plants and the like.  
As a consequence of weak external accountabilities the provincial company has not been 
directed to operate in this manner. Instead of operating to promote economic development in 
the Lau province, the provincial company has actually drawn resources from the province and 
invested them elsewhere. Central government monies allocated to provide development 
assistance in the province has also been redirected to the company. The directors representing 
the A class shareholders all live on Fiji‟s mainland, so although the majority of Class A 
shareholders reside in the province, they are effectively disenfranchised. Accountability 
provided to Class A shareholders residing on Fiji‟s mainland has enabled these parties to 
challenge the direction the company has taken, but to date with no real success. These 
shareholders have however received some incidental benefits over and above their dividend 
payments being able to access accommodation at the Company‟s hotels at discounted prices 
and through living in the economy that the company has invested in. Only since 2008 have 
dividends from the Provincial Council‟s shareholding been used to sustain its activities. With 
cuts in central government funding to the provinces it is by no means clear that their 
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dividends have been channelled to development work, or simply used to sustain the 
provincial council‟s administration. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the 
company has retarded economic development in the Lau province rather than enhanced it.  
The literature shows that accountability is central to providing effective functioning within 
entities, as it ensures the discharge of responsibility by those in charge (Bracci 2009; 
Velayutham and Perera, 2004). Accountability of the company follows an 
individualistic/loose/hierarchical configuration, that is accountability from the unit managers 
to the CEO to the board of directors to the shareholders. It is based on agent principal 
relationships found in developed western economies. However, there were weak connections 
between the elements, as there is little clarity in role expectations permitting the CEO to 
negotiate the terms of the relationship with the board, changing the nature of accountability. 
Additionally, the processes of accountability in the company were implicit and there was no 
monitoring of the performance and reports of the CEO. The board had placed a high level of 
trust on the CEO creating the potential for value conflict. This is as high trust leads to the use 
of communal forms of accountability where expectations are ill-defined (Laughlin, 1996). 
Ultimately this led to the dismissal of the CEO of the provincial company.  
The company‟s individualistic/loose/hierarchical accountability configuration results in 
operations based on the decisions of the elite few, without being questioned on how resources 
have been utilized or the achievement of objectives. Without change in the accountability 
configuration may perpetuate the company‟s failure to provide returns to its shareholders 
through either distributable dividends or services can be expected to continue. The 
established accountability configuration has allowed the company to operate in the interests 
of management, to some extent the interests of the provincial council administration and 
certain parties with high social status within the province.  
Indigenous Fijian culture, however, still influences accountability, especially the large power 
distance in societies (see Davie 2005, 2007), the high levels of trust placed on those in charge 
coupled with the lack of self-accountability, the culture of respect and silence, and the lack of 
attention to detail and planning (Qalo, 1997) all promote weak forms of accountability. 
Strong forms of accountability can be practiced by communities. This requires explicit, 
unambiguous documented procedures to be established. Additionally, such standards of 
performance and accountability have to be monitored with consequences for deviance 
established, in order to be taken seriously. Similarly, Ratuva (2002) recommended that the 
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economic feasibility and credibility of such indigenous owned companies needs to be 
facilitated by a clearly defined system of constant monitoring and a transparent reporting 
process (ibid). Reconstructing accountabilities can impact favourably on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the provincial administration system and the commercial arms of the 
provinces. If prevailing cultures impede such a transformation the Fijian administration may 
be obliged to conclude that provincial development cannot be delivered by companies 
established and influenced by provincial councils. 
While this conclusion is drawn from an analysis of one province and its related company, it 
must be born in mind that all other provincial companies have been consistently unprofitable 
[16]. 
Companies set up by the other provinces have all attempted to engage in their provincial 
economies at some time in their operations. This offers opportunities for future research, 
together with additional analysis on the cultural configuration of indigenous Fijian societies 
and their corresponding accountability system. Future research can explore how changes in 
indigenous Fijian societies have impacted, or failed to impact on the nature, forms and 
processes of accountability. Additionally, further studies can be undertaken on the other 
provincial companies to identify how cultural factors impact on internal and external 
accountability and their effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of such companies. 
Notes 
1. That is referring to the primary cultural dimensions of „individualism and 
collectivism‟, „cultural tightness and looseness‟, and „hierarchy versus 
egalitarianism‟. 
2. The Indo-Fijian population first came to Fiji as a result of the economic imperatives 
of colonialism. This necessitated the import of indentured Indian labourers to Fiji 
between the periods 1879 to 1916 to extract profit from the sugar plantations (Ghosh, 
2000). 
3. Who was also prime minister of Fiji during this period. 
4. Individual shareholders of the provincial company could benefit from discounted rates 
when staying at the hotels. 
5. Hereinafter, referred to as „elements‟. 
6. Gelfand et al. (2004) locates eight different accountability configurations but 
discusses only the above four. 
7. These are the individuals from the Lau province who have migrated from the islands 
and are now residing outside of the Lau province in the rural and urban centers of Fiji. 
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8. Also referred to as the „Tui Nayau’, who is the paramount chief of the Lau province. 
The latest holder of this title was the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The successor to 
this title has not been installed since the death of the late paramount chief in April, 
2004. Extended vacancies of this kind are commonplace in Fiji. 
9. The TAB is responsible for the Fijian Administration, which includes all the 
provinces in Fiji. 
10. A provincial council shall be made up of mata-ni-tikina(s) (Tikina representatives); 
Tikina chiefs; women‟s representative; youth representatives; and urban dwellers 
representatives (Fijian Affairs Provincial Councils Regulations, 1996). 
11. Numerous attempts were made to interview the board of directors but the author was 
referred to the former CEO and when the former CEO was relieved of his role, the 
author was referred to the Finance Manager. 
12. The current chairwoman is the daughter of the late paramount chief and also wife of 
the current President of Fiji. 
13. Fiji Companies Law Section 135(1) (a) „Length of notice for calling meeting‟.  
14. The provincial council represents the interests of the province and majority of 
provincial members invest in the company through their monetary contributions to the 
provincial council. 
15. FHL (2012) was founded in 1984 to accelerate indigenous Fijian participation in the 
economy. It operates as an investment vehicle. Its shareholders include Provincial 
Councils, which were allocated shares to be paid for from initial dividends, other 
Fijian institutions, Tikina and village groups, Fijian co-operatives, individual Fijians 
and family companies.  FHL is quoted on the South Pacific Stock Exchange restricted 
list. That is to say, its shares can only be held by indigenous Fijians. 
 
16. Another provincial company is the subject of a separate study. In this case serious 
shortcomings in accountability between the company and the provincial population 
were also found. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Cultural dimension and impact on accountability web 
Cultural Dimension Characteristic of accountability web 
Individualism 
 
Locus of accountability forces is at the specific individual level 
Little number of cross-level connections 
High self-accountability 
Formalized and explicit standards, communicated directly to 
individuals 
Individuals are held accountable for violations of standards 
 
Collectivism Locus of accountability forces is at the group level 
High number of cross-level connections 
Extraorganisational sources of accountability highly salient 
Informal and implicit standards, indirectly communicated to society 
Groups held culpable for violations of standards 
Loose Fewer norms, standards  
Unclear norms, standards 
Standards are proposed and interpreted 
Less monitoring of norms, standards 
Less severe consequences for deviance 
Divergent understandings of accountability 
Low structural alignment 
Tight Many norms, standards 
Clear norms, standards 
Standards are imposed and received 
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Monitoring of norms, standards 
Severe consequences for deviance 
Shared understandings of accountability 
High structural alignment 
Egalitarian Prevalence of bidirectional connections 
Hierarchical  Prevalence of unidirectional connections 
Source: Adapted from Gelfand et al., 2004 (p. 144) 
 
Glossary of iTaukei words 
Buli a Fijian administrative official who was in charge of tikina or district 
affairs during the colonial era 
 
iTaukei indigenous Fijian 
 
Koro an indigenous Fijian village, where there may exist various tokatoka, 
mataqali who may all be part of a yavusa 
 
Lauan an indigenous Fijian with paternal links to the Lau province 
 
Mataqali a sub-clan which is composed of one or a number of extended 
families (tokatoka) 
 
Ratu a title given to a male chief in parts of Fiji only 
 
Roko (i) in the colonial era this is a title given to the holder of a chiefly 
office (ii) an administration official in charge of a province 
 
Tikina the subdivisions/districts within one province which is usually based 
on pre-colonial Vanua structures 
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Tokatoka extended family group traced patrilinealy  
 
Tui king 
Turaga title given to the headman which can be a chief or a commoner 
holding some important post e.g. Turaga ni Koro (village headman); 
Turaga ni Yavusa (the leader or headman of a clan) etc. 
 
Vakavanua following traditional protocols 
 
Vanua all the resources i.e. human and non-human in a defined boundary; 
Turaga ni Vanua – may refer to the chief within a defined boundary 
or all adult titled males within a defined boundary 
 
Vola ni Kawa Bula  a listing of all indigenous Fijians according to tokatoka, village, 
vanua, tikina, mataqali, and province 
 
Yavusa is a clan which is the largest kinship group within the context of a 
Vanua; within a Yavusa there may be more than one mataqali 
 
